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RESUMEN 
Los años 1880-1914 fueron de crecimiento institucional y de sistemática 
consolidación en el sector bancario inglés. A principios del siglo xix se pro-
dujeron una serie de crisis que afectaron seriamente a los bancos de Inglaterra 
y Gales. Una de sus consecuencias fue generar preocupación sobre la liquidez 
de los bancos, planteándose simultáneamente interrogantes sobre la adecuada 
composición de los créditos al sector privado. El artículo examina los pro-
cedimientos utilizados por los bancos para minimizar los riesgos y estudia 
algunos aspectos de las prácticas crediticias que se aplicaron en las regiones 
más industrializadas de Gran Bretaña. En la primera parte se resume la orga-
nización y los métodos de control adoptados por las principales sociedades 
anónimas bancarias. La segunda presenta un esquema para la evaluación y 
seguimiento de los créditos. Y la tercera analiza las prácticas de los bancos 
en sus préstamos al sector industrial. 
ABSTRACT 
The years 1880-1914 were years of institutional growth and systemic con-
solidation for English banks. In the early and middle decades of the nineteenth 
century there had been a number of crises which had affected the banks of 
England and Wales. Ono effect was to raise anxieties about the liquidity of 
bank balance sheets, including fundamental questions about the composition 
of lending to the private sector. In particular, the paper discusses the pro-
cedures used by the banks to minimise risk and examines some aspects of 
actual lending practice as it applied to the industrial regions of Britain. There 
are three parís to the paper. The fírst briefly summarises the organisational 
and control structures that were introduced by the large ¡oint-stock 
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banks to standardise lending at their numerous branches. The second section 
introduces a schema íot the assessment and monitoring of loans, and the 
third discusses some of the banks' pre-1914 practices with regard to loans 
to industry. 
INTRODUCnON 
The years 1880-1914 were years of institutional growth and systemic 
consolidation for English banks. In the early and middle decades of the 
nineteenth century there had been a number of crises which had affected 
the banks of England and Wales. One effect was to raise anxieties about 
the liquidity of bank balance sheets, including fundamental questions about 
the composition of lending to the prívate sector. In particular, the crisis 
of 1878 occurred after a prolonged period of industrial difficulty and, within 
the banks themselves, raised concerns about the extent to which industrial 
loans were illiquid and unmarketable —over-committed to particular firms, 
or sectors, and committed for too long a period. In contrast to these earlier 
troubled times, by the beginning of the twentieth century English banks 
were extremely stable, with possibly the most stable banking system in 
the world at the time. Obviously, a number of factors contributed to this 
stability— not least, the growth of scale of banking firms, the greater spread 
of risk achieved through bank amalgamations and the extensión of branch 
networks, and (in the form of the Bank of England) the existence of an 
effective lender of last resort —but this paper concéntrales on just one 
of the central issues: the policy adopted by the commercial banks themselves 
in their lending to industry. In particular, the paper discusses the procedures 
used by the banks to minimise risk and examines some aspects of actual 
lending practice as it applied to the industrial regions of the Britain. 
We should make it clear at the outset that the article does not add 
to what we know of the scale of lending, ñor of its división between 
short-term, and long-term lending through rolled over overdrafts. Those 
have been dealt with in a different ways elsewhere '. Neither do we discuss 
further the assessment of individual customers and why banks refused loans, 
ñor do we provide further detall on the practice of lending to industrial 
firms .^ Rather the focus is on the changing intemal organisation that was 
devised by a banking system undergoing change to cope with the changing 
' See Capie and Collins (1992); and Capie and CoUins (1991) 
' See Capie and Collins (1996). 
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world of the late nineteenth and early twenüeth century. This has neces-
sitated an investigation of the day to day business in the banks and has 
been made possible by an extensive trawl through the archives of the major 
banks. However, there is not the space to detail all the cases we examined 
and instead the argument is illustrated with examples which are repre-
sentative of what was generally the case. 
It seems appropriate too to make the point that contrasts have long 
been made between bank lending in England (or the Anglo-Saxon/An-
glo-American model as it is sometimes called) and the system that prevailed 
in much of Europe, a system usually called universal. In the former the 
emphasis is on short-term lending and in the universal, as the ñame implies, 
it is said to be charterised by commercial and investment banking and 
by long-term commitment and long-term lending with improved informa-
tion flows and so on. The debate on the relative merits of these systems 
has run for a long time and many refinements made to the original positions. 
A full and recent discussion of this can be found in Collins'. There is 
also some literature on the intemal structure —govemance— of the two 
respective systems. But there is a much more limited literature on orga-
nisation and control. 
There are three parts to the paper. The first briefly summarises the 
organisational and control structures that were introduced by the large 
joint-stock banks to standardise lending at their numerous branches. The 
second section introduces a schema for the assessment and monitoring 
of loans, and the third discusses some of the banks' pre-1914 practices 
with regard to loans to industry. 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
In the decades from the 1880s to the 1920s commercial banking in 
England and Wales underwent a major process of market concentration, 
concomitant with an unprecedented increase in scale for the largest banking 
companies. The system as a whole was transformed from one consisting 
of numerous small, local or regional banks to one dominated by a handful 
of national giants 1 Thus, between 1875 and 1913 the number of banks 
feU from 358 to seventy, yet the number of offices multiplied from 1,959 
to 6,573. More significantly, the share of the biggest fíve banks in total 
' See Collins (1998). 
' Collins (1994). 
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domestic deposits in England and Wales almost doubled, to just under 
41 per cent by 1913. By this date the «Big Five» had deposit liabilities 
of £419.5 million and proprietors' capital funds of just under £33 million. 
By 1920 these five banks were responsible for some 80 per cent of total 
deposits. 
As a consequence the banks' internal managerial and control systems 
underwent a bureaucratic revolution'. Such expansión and institutional 
change challenged oíd systems of management and control and evoked 
radical overhaul of oíd practices. Effective control depended critically on 
sound accounting practice and Richard Sayers, the historian of Lloyds Bank, 
provides some telling insights into the nature of the challenge made by 
these changes to established managerial practices . Lloyds was originally 
a family firm based in Birmingham, but it was a leading player in the 
amalgamation movement before World War I when it emerged as one 
of the biggest banks in Europe. When Lloyds became a joint-stock company 
in 1865 and embarked on a programme of expansión, new accounting 
procedures were required, but they initially resulted in total confusión. 
One of the partners, Howard Lloyd, describes how: «From the Managing 
Director down to júnior clerks no one had the slightest idea how to work 
the new ledgers on the progressive system or how to start or carry on 
proper entries in the new... books.» For two weeks neither the ledgers 
ñor the London account could be checked as it proved impossible to strike 
an accurate balance! This is a graphic illustration of the transformation 
that was required of the banks, of how major institutional growth neces-
sitated the introduction of new and effective control systems. 
One of the constituent banks that was eventually merged into Lloyds, 
the Gloucestershire Banking Co. (founded 1831, absorbed by Capital & 
Counties in 1886) provides an illustration of the other types of internal 
changes being introduced at this time. The Gloucestershire Bank developed 
a branch network of its own and during the 1870s and 1880s introduced 
internal reforms to cope with an increasingly diffused organisation. Local 
managers' discretion was curtailed and greater central scrutiny of lending 
was introduced. In 1882 the first set of rules on lending was printed inter-
nally, though the extent of its novelty as a tool of central management 
' Hertner and Pino (1998), provides a valuable summary of the historical literature 
on the evolution of the organization of the firm, particularly as applied to banks. The impor-
tant general literature includes Chandler (1962); Chandler (1992); Willamson (1981); Nelson 
and Winter (1982). 
" Sayers(1957),pp. 232-40. 
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is highlighted by the following entry two years later in the Directors' Minu-
tes: «It [has] been brought to the notice of the Board that the rules recently 
printed and distributed among the Managers of the several Branches for 
their guidance had been frequently disregarded.» It seems that at that 
time the concept of central control was indeed a novelty. At the same 
time head office's determination to impose standardisation and control 
is clear in the threat that «... the Weekly Committee be authorised to 
dismiss any manager who after this notice wilfully fails in... observance 
[of the rules]» .^ 
Sayers general view of the changes that were occurring at many of 
the constituent banks of Lloyds was that by the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century there was 'considerable centralisation of lending power', 
with the greater use of accountants, auditors and inspectors producing 
an increasingly tighter system of control. At Lloyds Bank itself the initial 
means of inspecting the branch offices had relied solely upon the company's 
accountants conducting a half-yearly visit to check the ledgers and cash 
balances. But this proved inadequate as the number of offices began to 
mushroom and, as early as the first half of the 1870s, regular branch ins-
pection had become incorporated into central office managerial respon-
sibilities. By the 1890s there existed a team of inspectors to check all 
aspects of branch work, including the scrutiny of bilis, securities and doubt-
ful debts. Head office managerial responsibilities had also been separated 
into different functions, with a specialist Advance Department set up in 
1879 to supervise lending at all bank offices. 
Another Birmingham-based bank, the Midland Bank, also had cióse 
connections with the business community. However, from its beginning 
in 1836 (as the Birmingham & Midland) it had been a joint-stock bank. 
It underwent rapid expansión and transformation (like Lloyds, mainly 
through the acquisition of other banks) in the decades around the tum 
of the century. In 1885, proprietors' capital stood at £0.6 million and there 
were just ten branches and eighty staff; in 1900, capital stood at £5 million, 
with 314 branches and 1,500 staff; and by 1918/20 (when by some measures 
the bank was the largest in the world) capital was £14 million, with 1,497 
branches and 10,697 staff employed *. This made it not just one of the 
largest financial institutions, but one of the largest business organisations 
from any sector at that time. 
Sayers(1957), p. 234. 
Holmes and Green (1986), Appendices. 
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At the Midland Bank, managerial response to keeping control over 
the lending was similar to that which occurred in the constituent banks 
of Lloyds, with the autocratic chief executive, Edward H. Molden, favouring 
a strict, centralised regime. After merger most of the absorbed banks quickly 
lost their autonomy and were incorporated into the Midland's control and 
managerial structures. «The expansión of staff numbers required uniform 
división of managerial and clerical duties and full protection against fraud, 
petty misdemeanours or mere slackness» .^ At managerial level, the lines 
of responsibility and Communications went from branch managers to the 
three general managers at head office in London. «From the late 1890s 
Midland's branch managers worked to standardised regulations and pro-
cedures, continually updated by new instructions and circulars... the main 
adjustments were in the evaluation of securities and bilis and in the handling 
of bad and doubtful debts» '". From the turn of the century aU loans over 
£2000 (worth about £85,000 now) had to go to the central board of direc-
tors for approval. As Holmes and Green show, this actually raised the 
existing ceiling on the branch managers' discretion over loans. Thus, 
amongst the Midland's constituent banks, the City Bank's ceiling on mana-
gers' discretion before take-over had been £500 or £1000 in the 1890s; 
in the London Joint Stock Bank it had been £1000 (£300 on unsecured 
loans); and in both the Leicestershire Banking Co. and the N & S Wales 
Bank, aU loans —irrespective of the amount— had had to be approved 
centrally. 
Thus, the banks managed the threat to control posed by the sharp 
expansión of the scale of their business by standardising rules on lending, 
circumscribing local managerial discretion (or, at least, formalising control 
over it), and by centralising decision-making and supervisory procedures. 
But the derivation of the stability of the system of bank lending went 
deeper than this. It depended ultimately on the fact that the English com-
mercial banks ensured that the process of lending was a relatively simple 
task, upon the inculcation of routine practices which minimised risk and 
assured portfolio liquidity. The scope of such practices can perhaps be 
best illustrated by reference to the detailed operation of industrial loan 
accounts, for it was such loans to industrial firms which had been a source 
of illiquidity and high risk in the past. 
' Holmes and Green (1986), p. 111. 
'" Holmes and Green (1986), p. 112. 
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THE PROCESS OF ASSESSING AND MONITORING BANK LOANS 
Before looking at the findings from the archival research, it will be 
useful to remind ourselves of the essential elements involved for a bank 
in making loans to the business sector. 
For analytical purposes it is possible to identify five main stages involved 
in the process used by bankers for assessing and monitoring industrial 
lending, for the gathering and evaluation of data for subsequent deci-
sion-making ' ' . 
I. Acquire Information on Borrower 
• background information (prívate enquiries and published material) 
• check available financial statements 
• assess «credit-worthiness» (e.g. set upper limit to which bank pre-
pared to go) 
II. Acquire Information on Loan 
• client's request re. valué of loan 
• intended purpose 
• means and proposed method of repayment 
III. Assess Risk 
a) Risks associated with firm; prospects for repayment? 
• general assessment of partners or directors—personality, personal 
wealth and degree of involvement with firm 
• judgement on ability of firm's current management 
• evaluation of future commercial performance of the firm itself 
• assessment of prospects for industrial sector in which firm operating 
" For a fuller versión see Eisenreich (1981), pp. 2-13. Also see Stanga and Benjamín 
(1978), pp. 17-21: And Berry, Citrón and Jarvis (1983), pp. 27-55. 
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b) Risk attached to security; hoto realisable? 
• type of security offered?—personal, marketable or not? 
• valuation of security 
• margin between sum lent and valué of security 
• legal nature of bank's claim to security in case of default —determine 
claims of other creditors, e.g. debentures outstanding, mortgages? 
• bank's claim to client's other assets in case of default 
IV. Agree Terms of Loan 
• within branch jurisdiction or determined at divisional/head office 
level? 
• settle terms-size, duration, rate of interest 
V. Monitor Operation of Loan and Reappraisai 
• how conducted and by whom? 
• what happens if things go wrong? —application of correctives and-
sanctions by the bank. [How supportive, how pimitive?— factors deter-
mining response?] 
Historical practice wül have differed from this stylised model in various 
ways and, certainly, operations on individual accounts will have differed 
in detall. In fact, two or more phases covild well have overlapped or been 
omitted all together. Also, it is clear that some aspects of this form of 
information-gathering and assessment procedure would have been more 
applicable to new applicants than to existing clients with an established 
track record. Nevertheless, the use of such a normative model helps focus 
more clearly on the essential components of the pre-1914 decision-making 
process on industrial loans and it provides a standard framework within 
which to examine the complexity of circumstances and Interactive deci-
sion-making involved on individual accounts. 
OPERATION OF LENDING IN THE INDUSTRIAL REGIONS 
This section of the paper is based on archival research which has been 
conducted jointly by Forrest Capie (City University Business School) and 
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Michael Collins (Leeds University Business School) '^. First, a summary 
assessment is provided and, then, this is illustrated by reference to a number 
of specific cases. By the end of the nineteenth century, the process by 
which loan applications were appraised and subsequent movements on the 
account were monitored was already well-established, standardised and 
systematic. In the first instance it was the responsibility of the local manager 
to assess each application for a loan. But as we have seen, his discretionary 
powers were circumscribed. In cases above the discretionary ceiÜng imposed 
by his organisation he had to make an initial assessment, with a recom-
mendation to regional or head office who took the eventual decisión. Sub-
sequent monitoring of the account followed the same pattem, with the 
branch manager collecting information and making regular reports to his 
superiors, and it was his responsibility to alert sénior management to any 
problems on the account. 
A «prívate memoranda» book was used for the regular upgrading of 
the local bank manager's information on industrial clients and it was in 
that that he recorded his assessment and credit rating of clients. This study 
draws heavily on these contemporary, confidential records which reveal 
details of the operation of accounts, including explanations of decisions 
over lending. The purpose of the private memoranda was twofold. In the 
first instance they served as an aide memoir for the bank manager who 
had to deal at irregular intervals with a large number of customers. He 
needed to be able to look up a particular client in the index and refresh 
his memory about previous interviews and correspondence and about the 
details of the client firm's business. Because of this, the private memoranda 
books constitute, in effect, a record of all Communications between manager 
and customer, together with any private thoughts the manager might have 
had on the financial position and prospects of firms which were important 
enough to note down. Their second function aróse out of managerial control 
requirements within the banks. Towards the turn of the century, the use 
of the same type of private memoranda books by the increasing numbers 
of local branch managers employed within the one bank was part of the 
intemal efforts of the more successful, large multi-branch banks to increase 
'^  The results reponed in this article are part of a larger project financed by the Economic 
and Social Reserch Council —ref. R000232220: «Commercial Banks and Industrial Finance 
in England and Wales, 1850-1914», which is jointly supervised by Michael Collins and Forrest 
Capie. We are particularly grateful for the help and encouragement of the Midland Bank 
pie. National Westminster Bank pie, Barclays Bank pls, Lloyds Bank pie and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland pie, and we are indebted to Judith Wale and Phillip Hunt who were 
employed on the project to conduct the archival work. 
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and standardise Úie degree of control exercised by the organisation's central 
management from head office (or from a centralised loan department). 
For this reason the books also provide a record of Communications between 
local manager and head office. It is in this capacity that they also provide 
insights into policy on bank lending to industry. 
We have built up an extensive data set of Information on over 3,000 
individual industrial accounts, drawn from intemal, confidential records 
of the operations at 268 sepárate branches of twenty individual banks (with 
particular use of the records of Lloyds Bank and the Midland Bank). These 
relate to both existing customers and approaches from prospective cus-
tomers. Although the period for which records are available on individual 
industrial accounts differs a great deal, for many it has been possible to 
follow operations over a number of years, sometimes decades. In aggregate, 
the prívate memoranda material covers the years, 1866-1914, and the cove-
rage is such that the resultant sample may be taken as representative of 
the sort of industrial lending being made by English commercial banks 
in the provinces at that time. Overdrafts of all sizes are included, encom-
passing a wide range from small businesses with a single proprietor to 
some of the largest companies of the period. The localities included in 
the study were drawn mainly from the industrial heartlands of the midlands 
and north of England, although some of the accounts were based in Lon-
don, Wales and on the south coast. In sum, it has been possible to compile 
rich detall on a sample of industrial accounts in the west, east and north 
Midlands, Lancashire, Yorkshire, and the north-east of England —^with 
supplementary material on South Wales. 
The records show that, in most circumstances debit accounts were revie-
wed at least once a year. This was a consequence of the fact that loans 
were formally granted for short periods. Thus, from the period, 1880-1914, 
less than five per cent of our sample of loans was granted in the first 
instance for longer than twelve months. Therefore, continuation or renewal 
of a loan created frequent opportunities for the bank to re-appraise the 
client's credit and the terms of the loan. As with an initial loan application, 
the local manager would gather together the Information and make a report 
to head office for these reappraisals. The manager's Information was derived 
from a variety of sources though, obviously, straight-forward, direct ques-
tioning of the client, or sénior representatives of the client firm —at inter-
view and through correspondence— was almost a universal practice. Mana-
gers would normally try to obtain balance sheets and other financial 
accounts, and Üsts of company directors and shareholders where appro-
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priate, either direct from the client or from any published source. Writing 
in 1885 in the Journal of the Institute of Banken, T. B. Moxon had advised 
that: «The investigation of a balance sheet may be taken as a desirable 
preliminary to the granting of any accommodation to a firm...», and the 
internal records show that managers routinely followed this advice. Howe-
ver, success in obtaining informative financial statements depended greatly 
upon the status of the client. In the case of corporate clients few difficulties 
were encountered in gaining access to some sort of financial statement, 
but many solé traders and prívate partnerships did not employ an accoun-
tant or were not prepared to show the bank their accounts (even if such 
existed in any systematic form). Sometimes a bank insisted, suggesting 
an accountant if need be, but for such firms the manager relied largely 
upon Information of a more general sort from his own contacts in the 
local community; perhaps from referees nominated by the client and accep-
table to the bank; and newspaper and trade reports. Over time, the strong 
trend amongst industrial firms towards incorporation meant that, in fact, 
a banker's access to balance sheets became easier. As an indication of 
this it is worth noting that amongst our sample of industrial accounts, 
prívate firms outnumbered companies by five to one in the early 1880s, 
but by World War I the situation had been reversed and companies out-
numbered prívate firms by more than three to one. 
Information was assembled locally, but it had to be reported upwards 
to divisional or central headquarters, together with the local branch mana-
ger's recommendations on whether or not to lend, to what amount and 
on what securities. As we have seen, the decisión was subject to formal 
approval from head office. The strength of the system lay in the central 
role it gave to local appraisal —to the local, specialised knowledge of branch 
managers— at the same time as ensuring that this was subject to central 
scrutiny and sanction. Within the bank, the branch manager, with his local 
contacts and regional knowledge, would normally be in the best position 
to assess the credit-worthiness of local businesses. Conversely, head office 
offícials were best placed to ensure all loans complied with the banks' 
overall regulations and policy. Those regulations themselves and the long 
apprenticeship of managers ensured the thorough inculcation of the bank's 
established principies and practices on lending to businesses. The internal 
records show that branch managers were constantly reminded of current 
regulations, taken to task by head office or divisional superíors for the 
slightest breach, and obliged to justify in full any digressions from normal 
practice. 
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The concerns of the sénior management were of two sorts: overall asset 
management; and conformity in the application of the rules. First, good 
asset management obviously set an upper limit to the proportion of a bank's 
total assets it was considered desirable to hold in a non-marketable form 
such as loans. On the one hand, this was a question of prudence and 
established banking conventions; on the other, it was a question of pro-
fitability. Trends in interest rates and the opportunities for the employment 
of bank funds in outlets other than loans to the business sector were impor-
tant, but always within the overall constraint of the liquidity and prudent 
distribution of a bank's overall balance sheet ^^ . Goodhart shows that at 
the London head offices of the major clearing banks there was cióse scrutiny 
of the overall ratio of relatively high-risk, eaming assets —particularly the 
ratio of advances (loans and bilis together)— to deposits '''. As a matter 
of routine, every bank watched this eamings ratio carefuUy (with the Mid-
land recording the ratio every week in its balance sheet) and generally 
it would seem that some concern would be expressed if the ratio of advances 
to deposits for the bank as a whole rose above 55 per cent, and positive 
alarm if the ratio should rise above 60 per cent for any length of time. 
It was in this área, of course, that large, geographically-dispersed banks 
such as the Midland had an advantage over smaller, less well-diversifíed 
banks whose ability to spread risks was constrained in that they were less 
able to balance branches with high «eaming ratios» against those with 
low ratios. An article in the Journal of the Institute of Bankers of 1906 was 
even more conservative, suggesting a ratio of advances to Habilities of just 
40 per cent. Our own calculations show that, in fact, this ratio for all 
English and Welsh banks averaged around 50 per cent from the middle 
of the 1890s onwards. 
There is no evidence in studies such as those of Goodhart or in the 
primary sources we have researched, that contemporary banks drew any 
clear distinction in their overall asset management between loans to the 
business sector and loans to other parts of the non-bank prívate sector. 
Because of their greater liquidity attributes, loans to the banking sector 
and loans to govemment were treated differently, but all other prívate 
sector loans were generally lumped together for portfolio management pur-
poses. However, there were some exceptions to this general pattem. Occa-
sionally fear of undue risk or over-exposure in a particular sector did intro-
" Goodhart (1972). 
' ' Goodhart (1972), pp. 156-58. 
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duce a discriminatory element within the central management of loans. 
For instance, the prívate memoranda suggest that difficulties in individual 
sectors led to some reluctance to provide loans for the promotion of new 
cycle companies in the aftermath of the 1896 flotation boom, and reluctance 
to lend to brewery companies in the early 1900s, partly because of declining 
profitability and partly because of impending legislation which threatened 
property valúes. 
In addition to issues of overall asset structure, the second major concern 
of head office regulators was to ensure that the terms goveming individual 
loans complied with bank regulations. Thus, local managers had to be meti-
culous in ensuring that the size of the loan, its duration, its purpose and 
the security offered by the borrower all met normal crítería. He (with the 
aid of a solicitor or accountant if need be) was also responsible for checking 
on the legal standing of the borrower, for establishing legal responsibility 
for meeting repayment (potentially more complicated in the case of cor-
porate clients than prívate partnerships with unlimited liability), and for 
checking the status of any collateral being offered. Regulations goveming 
such matters were frequently updated and regularly communicated to all 
managers. On occasions, head office was willing to bow to special pleading 
from the branch manager for a varíation of the normal rules if there were 
peculiar circumstances pertaining to the client, but this was only allowed 
if the manager could demónstrate that the bank's interest were nonetheless 
fully protected (e.g. through the provisión of adequate collateral). Rarer 
stül, were cases where dissatisfied clients by-passed the local manager and 
negotiated direct with head office —an option that would be feasible for 
only the largest clients with influential directors or partners. 
On the other hand, head offices very rarely contradicted the advice 
of local managers. We interpret this as a measure of the success of the 
process of control and standardisation, with branch managers aware of 
and stríctly applying corporate rules and, thus, operating as an effective 
local filter before requests reached sénior management. Managers were 
in no doubt as to what constituted an acceptable loan and they would 
normally refuse to send up to head office a client's request which they 
knew to be in breach of the standard rules. It also seems a reasonable 
assumption that in such circumstances, most business people —i.e. the 
borrowing client— would have been conversant with what form of accom-
modation their banker would and would not normally countenance. Thus, 
prima facie, we would not expect records to reveal many requests from 
industríalists for fixed capital funding, or for loans over very long períods. 
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or for the provisión of mortgages, as it was widely known that commercial 
banks did not provide such a service. Indeed, other results from diis project 
show that, in fact, this was true —industrialists rarely sought such loans 
from their bankers " . 
The application of these general principies can best be illustrated by 
reference to the actual operation of a number of accounts. First, two indus-
trial accounts held at Lloyds Bank. It is clear from these that a feature 
of contemporary bank practice with respect to industrial loans was the 
frequent (once a year) sight of a client firm's balance sheet by the bank 
manager and the submission of his subsequent appraisal to head office. 
Balance sheets were also frequendy requested before deciding on an exten-
sión of an existing overdraft limit. Both individual examples provide some 
insight into the use made by the banks of clients' balance sheets. 
The first of these accounts was held at the Birmingham Five Ways 
branch of Lloyds by Hunt & Mitton, a general engineering firm '^. The 
account was opened in November 1881 and by January 1882 there was 
a general overdraft facility of í200. Over the following three decades, this 
limit was the subject of fairly frequent re-negotiation (generally in an 
upward direction) and it stood at almost £4,000 by the end of the century. 
Audited balance sheets were part of Hunt & Mitton's bargaining counters 
when negotiating increases to the loan. When the business was strong the 
engineering fírm used its balance sheet to support the case for the con-
tinuation or extensión of bank credit. Indeed, this was regular practice 
through the 1880s. On a later occasion —in May 1900— the bank was 
initially reluctant to grant the firm's request for an increase but was per-
suaded by the presentation of favourable detailed, audited accounts. Indeed 
as a prívate partnership (and, early in the history of the account, as a 
solé trader), the client firm in this case would seem in normal circumstances 
to have had the upper hand over the bank in that the public provisión 
of balance sheets was not a legal requirement, Hunt & Mitton did not 
always strike one (or, at least, claimed not to have done so) and, thus, 
in response to enquiries from the bank they could inform the manager 
that precise financial information was not always available for his inspection, 
or simply fail to show it to him. In fact, the bank manager was ever conscious 
of the sensitivities of prívate partners to too much meddling in their affairs. 
In reality, much depended on the circumstances and the relative balance 
" Capie and Collins (1996), pp. 26-44; and Capie and Collins (1999), 
" The archives of Lloyds TSB pie —ref: Birmingham Five Ways, 1881-1913, 
LBA/B477a/4-6. 
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of negotiating strength between the bank and client. When the client was 
keen to keep the bank «sweet», detailed accounts would be proffered. 
Thus, when the bank was being asked to consider a new or extended 
loan the bank might ask to see a recent balance sheet. In more normal 
circumstances, however, the bank felt unable to press for such Information. 
The regular production for bank perusal of annual balance sheets was 
common throughout the 1880s on the account of Hunt & Mitton whenever 
the firm sought more bank accommodation. From these, the bank manager 
reported to head office the composition of assets and liabilities, recorded 
the profít and loss and, from the working of the bank account, could easily 
see the tumover of the firm's business. For instance, the manager noted 
the following in a typical entry (in this case for April 1885): 
Balance sheet for 31.12.84 showed £3100 capital, £217 overdraft, £150 pat-
tems, £738 plant etc. Profit for year £974; they had made ampie allowance 
for wear and tear and had written down the plant and stock (and increased 
the pattems) to such an extent that under the hammer they would fetch 
at least the balance sheet amounts. All bad debts written off. 
However, the bank manager did not rely upon accounting Information 
alone. Again, much depended upon the relative strength of the bank's 
and client's negotiating position of the moment. Interviews with the partners 
were normal when an extra loan was required (and the bank had a stronger 
hand to play), and the manager did discuss the detailed valuation of assets 
submitted by the firm. In December 1887, for instance, Hunt & Mitton 
were seeking a short-term overdraft of £500 to enable them to purchase 
the léase on their works. The firm had claimed to have spent £1000 on 
the works, but Lister, a sénior executive from the Advance Department 
of Lloyds, undertook a site visit and raised doubts about the firm's own 
valuation, beÜeving the works to be worth no more than £600. On this 
basis he recommended a loan of £400 but, significantly, it was left to 
the local manager himself to make the final decisión. In this case, £500 
—the amount the client was seeking— was advanced, with the deeds of 
the works being deposited with the bank. 
To summarise, balance sheets were, thus, routinely used on the account 
whenever available, but in the case of prívate partnerships the Information 
was not always available and, when it was, the bank was prepared to base 
its judgement on a wider consideration of the client's circumstances. 
The second illustrative case focuses on how the regular scrutiny of 
balance sheets could alert the bank to possible difficulties. The account 
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was that of the Leeds Engineering & Hydraulic Co. Ltd. which ran into 
some problems and began to draw heavily on the local branch of Lloyds 
Bank ^^ . The troubles of the firm were not discussed in the records in 
detail, but the bank was very anxious not to extend the limit of its own 
commitments and, ultimately, restricted it own involvement. The entries 
on the account for 1900-1902 show that the bank was lending the firm 
some £800 and the bank manager's examination of the annual balance 
sheets led him to the conclusión that the firm was under-capitalised. Profíts 
were very poor and he felt that there had been inadequate allowance in 
the accounts for depreciation. The balance sheet figures, thus, suggested 
that bank accommodation should be cut unless the firm could arrange 
an infusión of new capital. 
The firm itself was seeking a long-term solution through the issue of 
shares and incorporation as a limited company Qanuary 1902], and the 
bank was persuaded to continué the loan until the additional equity was 
raised. In December 1902 the new company was duly registered with 
£25,000 of ordinary and preference shares, and £10,000 of debentures. 
Part of the capital was used to pay £2,500 off a mortgage debt. The bank 
manager insisted on full Information on these arrangements and he passed 
them on to his head office. Only on the basis of this satisfactory financial 
Information was the bank prepared to offer the new company an overdraft 
facility for £1,000. [April and August 1903] 
Both these accounts reveal the importance of balance sheets, frequent 
reviews, and the local manager's judgement at different stages of the scree-
ning and monitoring process outlined in section two. They also show clearly 
how the system of local knowledge and centralised control operated in 
practice. This was a system that aróse naturally from the form of growth 
chosen by the English banks —expansión through acquisition. It enabled 
the predator bank to acquire a series of smaller banks and their existing 
network of branches and branch managers with local knowledge. It would 
have been much more difficult if, say, expansión had been sought through 
the establishment of brand new branches, set up in direct competition 
to existing local banks. In this hypothetical case, there would have been 
a serious constraint on the supply of candidates with suitable status and 
adequate local Imowledge and connections to make a good branch manager. 
" Lloyds TSB plc-ref: Leeds, 1900-14. BA/B793a/3-9). 
202 
ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL AND ENGLISH COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING TO INDUSTRY 
INFORMATION ON THE BORROWER 
The banker's assessment of the character and wealth of the borrower 
was the starting point for all decisions on lending. Judgement as to the 
extent of the client's asset holdings, indebtedness, Business acumen and 
integrity were obviously central to whether the bank was wilMng to grant 
a loan, and to the size, type and duration of that loan. For the initial 
assessment —say, when an account was opened, or a loan requested for 
the first time— the manager depended in the first instance on his know-
ledge of the local business community and upon Information from his own 
business and social contacts. This would be supplemented with Information 
from the client and —especially if the firm was active outside the locality— 
from the bank's other offices and other sources of Information such as 
newspapers. 
As has already been suggested, the client firm's legal status was critical 
to the evaluation. In the case of solé traders or partnerships with unlimited 
liability, the firm's identity and available assets were synonymous with those 
of the partners. In the case of corporate clients, assessment of the wealth 
and character of leading directors, shareholders and managers was con-
ducted in a similar manner, but in these cases particular regard had to 
be paid to the legal status of the company, the extent of proprietorial 
liability and the potential claims of other creditors (e.g. debenture holders). 
In those days of personal capitalism, undoubtedly a good part of such 
evaluations was necessarily subjective (though this is not to suggest that 
such an element does not continué to be important in today's decisión 
maidng). However, within the context of the amount and quality of infor-
mation available, all the banks in the study appear to have operated in 
an impartial marmer. If the outcome of the assessment of the client's assets 
was favourable, then loans were available (subject only to the normal, stan-
dardised criteria). 
In making such judgements there was no apparent prejudice, for ins-
tance, against any particular type of business activity or sector. No one 
sort was favoured over another (given the same conditions regarding size, 
available Information, and so on). Thus, there are many illustrations of 
loans to new forms of activities — l^oans to new firms and for the financing 
of new products by both established and new firms (e.g. in the machine 
tool, electricity, cycle and motor vehicle sectors)— as well as loans to firms 
in established sectors following well-established. Similarly, there was no 
apparent bias against any particular form of business enterprise —solé tra-
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der, partnership, prívate company, public company, with limited and unli-
mited proprietorial liability— although details of securities and collateral 
taken could differ from one type to another depending upon the relative 
legal positions. In fact, the prívate memoranda materíal shows that, around 
the tum of the century, a number of the larger banks were actively engaged 
in the process of launching new corporations and converting established 
partnerships to limited companies. In these cases, bank involvement might 
take the form of loans to fínance the operation, with some general advice 
on the launch but never the underwriting of issues (which was left to spe-
cialist institutions) ñor the purchase of equity. 
The main exceptions to the absence of discrimination towards particular 
sectors or types of firm were on those occasions when the bank judged 
that the business environment in which certain sectors were operating was 
particularly unfavourable. As was noted earlier, there was a great reluctance 
to take on new cycle company customers in the aftermath of the 1896 
surge of company flotations and overvaluations in that sector. Even here, 
though, existing cycle company clients were afforded their customary loans 
to allow for the winter season of stock building. Similarly, in the early 
1900s there was also an unwillingness to lend to breweries on the security 
of mortgages of licensed properties, particularly in the years when impen-
ding legislation created uncertainty over the future of some properties. 
This policy decisión was also against the backdrop of poor profits per-
formance for many of the brewery companies. Another example of 
industry-specific discrimination is the Midland Bank's reluctance to lend 
for more cotton miU construction in Lancashire just before 1914 because 
of fears of over capacity. Also in the case of the Midland, Holmes and 
Green suggest the bank was reluctant to lend to collieríes at the tum of 
the century because of previous bad debt performance '*. In other words, 
the banks were not prejudiced in any irrational way, in all the examples 
the perceived increase in rísk was based on a rational assessment of market 
prospects. 
One factor that could make a difference to the bank's attitude duríng 
the detailed operation of an account was the relative size of client firm 
and of its loans. Not surprisingly, the wealthy and influential were more 
likely to encounter bank tolerance to small indiscretions in the operation 
of the account. Indeed, small, troublesome accounts seem to have been 
most vulnerable to adverse decisions being taken by the bank. In such 
'* Holmes and Green, 117. 
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cases, the potential loss was easier to absorb than on a large account and 
—all things being equal— the bank was inclined to be harsher when dif-
fículties aróse, insisting on adherence to prior agreements and, perhaps, 
calling in a loan. 
At the other end of the spectrum, a large well-established company 
or businessman tended to be treated more leniently. This was particularly 
true of the very large industrial firm on whose account the bank felt there 
was no danger of reneging on commitments. In such cases, the rules might 
not be applied as closely as normal (e.g. the bank might be afraid of causing 
offence by asking for a balance sheet statement from a very wealthy client 
who was used to seeing the affairs of his business as a personal or family 
matter). For the bank, of course, it would not be primarily a matter of 
etiquette, but of profit. Offence in such circumstances might not only lead 
to withdrawal of the (large) account but to threats to other business if 
the wealthy account holder let his connections know of the bank's attitude. 
The banks in the study routinely made use of Information in an effective 
and professional manner for both the initial scrutiny of requests for loans 
and the subsequent monitoring of accounts. A bank's decisions on lending 
on a particular account depended critically on the amount and quality of 
Information available to it. This was obviously true not only for its overall 
judgement of the client's credit-worthiness but also for recurrent decisions 
on loan requests. The bank was fundamentally concemed with the client's 
ability to service and repay the debt, but this almost invariably encompassed 
a judgement by the bank manager as to the client firm's commercial via-
biüty. As has already been stressed, there was regular use by the banks 
of financial accounts, especially balance sheets, with particular regard to 
the valuation and marketability of assets, the client firm's gearing ratios, 
the size and form of debt (debentures, mortgages, bank loans, etc.), the 
amount of uncalled capital, the amount of undistributed profits being ploug-
hed back into the business by partners and directors, the profitability of 
the business, and practice regarding the payment of dividends relative to 
current eamings. 
Site visits were organised if appropriate but these were rare. When 
they did take place they were used by the manager or the bank's valuer 
to assess the valué of assets (e.g. buildings and machinery) and, perhaps, 
to make a more general judgement on the organisation and prosperity 
of the concern. Sometimes, if the client firm was seeking a large or unusual 
loan relative to its assets, or if the bank had some anxieties about the 
client's ability to meet the terms of the loan, the manager might use the 
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opportunity afforded by such a visit to go through the fírm's accounts. 
In some circumstances, however, customers were prepared to supply only 
the minimum of information and caution would oblige the bank to restrict 
the extent of its commitments. In the case of wealthy prívate partnerships, 
once again a delicate touch may have been required from the manager 
if offence was to be avoided in circumstances where the concems of family 
and íirm intertwined and outside «interference» would not be tolerated. 
Some of the issues are illustrated by the case of firm of Edwin Bostock 
& Co., boot and shoe manufacturers, which had an account with the Man-
chester & Liverpool District Bank in Stafford ' ' . It was a family firm, a 
prívate partnership, where the legal liabilities and assets of business and 
family overlapped. The account was opened in 1878 when the capital in 
the business was reported by the client as £66,000 and at which time 
the firm was already «among the largest and oldest in the trade». [March 
1883] It is clear from the records that the high status of the client and 
contemporary conventions regarding prívacy and the acceptance of a gent-
leman's word, rendered it inappropríate for the bank to ask for (what 
was considered to be) confidential information. Thus, the bank had no 
detailed fínancial information about the client except for the workings on 
the bank account and any additional materíal volunteered by the family. 
In this case, the family offered the bank no additional information what-
soever. Instead, the bank manager had to rely on hearsay and personal 
contacts in order to update his information even in the most general man-
ner. For instance, in March 1884 the manager felt obliged to enter into 
his official record of the account that he had leamed confídentially from 
a leather merchant with whom he was acquainted that the sénior partner 
of the firm had been worth £70-80,000 at the time of his recent demise. 
The standing of the family was so high in fact that, on the basis of this 
sort of vague, general information, the bank continued to meet fuUy the 
fírm's request for an unsecured overdraft liinit of £5,000. It was only in 
1898 when the firm became a Hmited company «for reasons of convenience 
only» (with no shares being offered to public) that some formalised 
accounts became available which were then shown each year to the bank. 
[February 1898; March 1898] Henceforth, the manager reported the annual 
balance to head office, as he did for all corporate customers. The new 
limited company was granted the same overdraft limit as the prívate part-
" National Westminster plc-ref: 48, Manchester & Liverpool District, Stafford, 
1879-1908. NWBA/6002,9097-8. 
206 
ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL AND ENGLISH COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING TO INDUSTRY 
nership, £5000 (again, the amount required by the client), the only dif-
ference being that the directors (who no longer carried the same legal 
responsibility for the firm's debt as when it was an unlimited prívate part-
nership) had to sign personal guarantees against the amount. This, too, 
was a very common practice with respect to limited companies. 
Another illustrative account is one at Lloyds Bank, that of an armaments 
firm, G. Kynoch & Co ^°. The records on the account cover the very long 
period, 1876-1914, which spanned the life-cycle of the firm from its early 
existence as a solé trader through its restructuring as a limited company 
which, by the beginning of the twentieth century, had grown into one 
of Lloyds' largest industrial clients in the midlands. It is thus possible to 
detall the bank's treatment of the client's lending requests under different 
corporate structures. The account was opened in March 1876 when the 
solé owner of the firm, George Kynoch, transferred the account from the 
Birmingham & Midland Bank. The bank manager was told that the balance 
sheet for December 1875 had shown a surplus of assets of £97,000 (a 
rolling mili had recently been bought for £6,000) —as was often the case 
with solé trader and prívate partnerships, this Information was conveyed 
by word of mouth, no detailed accounts were presented for the manager's 
perusal. A tumover on the account of up to £300,000 was forecast, no 
bilí discounting facilities were required but an overdraft facility was neces-
sary. The bank agreed to an initial limit of £10,000 on the deeds of freehold 
and leasehold properties. Over the following eight years, in fact, the over-
draft ranged from £10-25,000, more often than not at about £15,000. The 
bank's security continued to be deeds of property though most was also 
covered by Kynoch's personal guarantee. Duríng this period the firm's status 
as a solé trader meant that the bank, apart from its own analysis from 
the working of the account itself, was obliged to rely upon the cÜent for 
the provisión of accurate financial Information about the business. In fact, 
the production of balance sheets was irregular, essentially dependent upon 
whether Kynoch thought it was in his interests to show the accoimts to 
the manager (say, when he was requesting more loans) and the balances 
that were produced were not independently audited. There is no suggestion 
of mis-representaion of the firm's position but obviously the circumstances 
meant the bank was denied regular access to relevant, verifiable Infor-
mation. 
^^  Lloyds TSB pie —ref; 3, Lloyds, Birmingham Colmore Row, Armaments. 1876-1914. 
LBA/B360a/37-8, 40-51. 
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The type and supply of information to the bank changed when the 
firm was incorporated as a limited company in 1884. From the bank's 
point of view, incorporation meant it had more ready access to regular 
(half-yearly) balance sheet and profit and loss accounts. These appear to 
have been audited, but they were still only general accounts —there was 
no question of the bank having access to detailed financial information 
about the business. Incorporation also meant that the bank's security was 
enhanced by the increase in the number of shareholders, although this 
was offset by the limited nature of shareholder liability which had not 
applied to Kynoch when he was a solé trader. 
With the creation of the new company, the terms of the bank account 
were re-negotiated. A normal overdraft limit of £15,000 (£700,000 in 
today's terms) was allowed against deeds provided that a sufficient margin 
of the company's share capital remained uncalled. If this were to be called 
up, however, the directors' personal guarantees would be required. This 
was typical of arrangements with limited companies —even if securities 
were held, the bank wanted the assurance that in the event of a liquidation 
there was either adequate shareholder liability (in the form of uncalled 
capital) or it could hold the directors legally responsible for the overdraft 
irrespective of the company's assets. 
CONCLUSIÓN 
A number of general comments can be drawn from these, and the 
many more individual cases in our survey. As regards their lending to the 
industrial sector, English commercial banks coped with the tremendous 
institutional growth that they experienced in the decades before World 
War I by developing a structure which married together local knowledge 
with a tighter system of central control. As we have seen, given the con-
ventions of the day and the persistence of personal capitalism, detailed 
information was sometimes difficult for the bank to come by in assessing 
and monitoring loans. This could have been a source of instability, especially 
as the lending business was not confined, as in some central European 
banks, to a small group of favoured industrialists well-known to the bank 
but, on the contrary, was relatively undiscriminating and open to virtually 
all businesses that applied and met the mínimum requirements. Yet the 
system was very stable, and losses on bad debts were low. Undoubtedly, 
a major factor in the adopted assessment and monitoring procedures was 
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that the rules governing all loans were kept simple, and standardised. In 
a simple manner it was this that facilitated both central control and ensured 
stability despite the sÍ2e of the organisations involved, and the rapidity 
of the institutional change they underwent. It was this simplicity that mini-
mised local decision-making as regards risk. It also minimised the requi-
rement for detailed Information about the borrower's business (which we 
have seen was not always available anyway). 
What were these rules? Formally, only short-term loans were allowed. 
Their purpose was confined largely to credit, working capital uses (henee, 
arrangements were subject to frequent review). If there were any doubts, 
security was taken (usually to the same valué as the loan). The specialised 
industrial knowledge required of the local managers was, thus, minimal 
—they could concéntrate on general financial issues such as the adequacy 
of collateral. For the bank's asset structure, liquidity of prívate sector loans 
and overall stability were assured. Were there any drawbacks with this 
system? Judgement here depends on how one views the function of com-
mercial banking. The English banks were extremely effective credit banks, 
they were definitely not investment banks. 
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